Cold War International History Project
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars


New Russian Documents on the Korean War, introduction and translations by Kathryn Weathersby






New Russian Documents on the Korean War

Introduction and Translations
by Kathryn Weathersby


In the previous issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin (Issue 5, Spring 1995 pp. 1, 2-9), I described the collection of high-level documents on the Korean War that Russian President Boris Yeltsin presented to President Kim Young Sam of South Korea in June 1994. I also presented translations of six key documents from that collection that illuminate the decision-making behind the outbreak of full-scale war in Korea in June 1950. Since the publication of the Spring 1995 Bulletin, the base of documentary evidence on the Korean War has been enriched even more by the release of virtually the entire collection of high-level documents on the war declassified by the Presidential Archive in Moscow, which numbers approximately 1,200 pages. Through a joint project of the Center for Korean Research of Columbia University and the Cold War International History Project, these documents are now available to all interested researchers.1
The Presidential Archive (known officially as the Archive of the President, Russian Federation, or APRF) is the repository to which, during the Soviet era, the Kremlin leadership sent its most sensitive records for safekeeping and ready access. Its holdings are therefore more selective than those of the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (CC CPSU), and the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, the other major repositories used by historians of the Cold War. The release of a large portion of the APRF's documents on the Korean War consequently provides a critical addition to available evidence on the high-level decisions and deliberations of the communist side during this pivotal conflict.
This article presents translations of and commentary on a sizable portion of this recently-released APRF collection on the Korean War. It begins with most of the released documents covering February 1950 through January 1951, providing a close look at the Soviet role in Korea during the significant first months of the conflict. (Unfortunately, some key materials from this period, particularly the months immediately preceding the war, have not yet become available; for key documents from mid-September to mid-October 1950, covering events from the Inchon landing to China's decision to intervene in the war, see the article by Alexandre Y. Mansourov elsewhere in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.) It then offers a more selective sample of documents from spring 1951 through the end of the war, focusing primarily on Stalin's approach to the armistice negotiations. As the reader will quickly discover, these documents of high-level decision-making within the Soviet government and within the Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang alliance shed light on many questions about the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet alliance, Soviet relations with North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK), Soviet attitudes toward the United States, and the making of Soviet foreign policy in general in the last years of Stalin's life. In this brief commentary I will therefore not attempt to provide a close examination of these documents, as I have in two previous Bulletin articles (and a related article in The Journal of American-East Asian Relations).2 Instead, I will point out some of the most important questions these new sources address, provide additional background information drawn from my research in other Soviet archives, and offer some preliminary conclusions.
The documents presented below begin where the records published in the previous Bulletin left off, with Stalin's telegram to the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang on 30 January 1950 informing Kim Il Sung that he would "assist" him in the matter of reunifying Korea by military means. Document #1 reveals that Kim Il Sung and Soviet Ambassador T.F. Shtykov interpreted Stalin's message as approval to plan an offensive campaign against South Korea. The North Korean leader received Stalin's telegram with "great satisfaction" and informed Shtykov that he would begin preparations for a meeting with Stalin at which the details of the campaign would be worked out. Shtykov's telegram to Soviet Defense Minister A.M. Vasilevsky on February 23 (document #4) supports accounts given by former DPRK military officers that Stalin began taking steps to strengthen the North Korean military forces even before Kim Il Sung's secret trip to Moscow in April, by appointing Major-General Vasiliev, a Hero of the Soviet Union and section chief for War Experience Analysis in the Soviet General Staff, to replace Shtykov as principal military adviser to the Korean People's Army (KPA).3
From Shtykov's telegram to Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky on February 7 (document #2), we see how closely Stalin supervised events in North Korea, deciding whether the DPRK could issue a bond, form an additional three infantry divisions, convene the Supreme People's Assembly, or send textile workers to the Soviet Union for training. Documents #5-9 indicate the reason why the highly nationalistic Korean communists allowed such interference in their country's affairs. As I discussed in the previous Bulletin, prior to the Korean War, North Korea was dependent on the Soviet Union for the substantial quantities of goods and the broad range of expertise needed to construct a new socialist state out of an abruptly truncated portion of the former Japanese empire. From 1945-1950, the only place to which the DPRK could turn for this support was the Soviet Union. Though many North Korean communists had close ties to the Chinese communist party, the latter was not in a position to aid its Korean comrades. In early 1950, the new People's Republic of China (PRC) government in Beijing led by Mao Zedong was itself forced to turn to Moscow for economic and military aid. As documents #11 and #13 indicate, in the spring of 1950 Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung were both interested in the possibility of developing wider trade and closer communications between the PRC and the DPRK. Close economic and military ties between Pyongyang and Beijing developed after the Chinese entered the Korean War; they were not in place prior to October 1950.4
At Stalin's insistence, after secretly receiving the Soviet leader's conditional green light for an attack against South Korea during a secret summit in Moscow in April (for which records still, alas, remain unavailable), Kim Il Sung traveled to Beijing in May 1950 in order to secure Mao Zedong's approval for the planned offensive. Documents #11 and #13 show that in his discussions with Kim Il Sung, Mao Zedong was considerably less worried about the possibility of military conflict with the United States than was the Soviet leadership, arguing that "the Americans will not enter a third world war for such a small territory." It also appears that in May 1950 Kim Il Sung, perhaps to counter the oppressive Soviet influence in North Korea, took a tentative step toward the strategy he later used so extensively of playing China and the Soviet Union against one another. He reported to Soviet Ambassador Shtykov that he had at first intended to ask Mao for ammunition for the Korean troops that had recently been transferred from China to North Korea (whose weapons were of Japanese and American manufacture rather than Soviet) but he decided not to raise the issue after all, since he was informed that the KPA had sufficient ammunition. Furthermore, he had no other requests to make of Mao "since all his requests were satisfied in Moscow and the necessary and sufficient assistance was given him there."
Shtykov's telegram to Vyshinsky on May 12 (document #13), reveals that before departing Pyongyang the following day for Beijing, Kim Il Sung reported to Shtykov that he had ordered the chief of the general staff to prepare his forces for the military operation against the South and that he wished to begin the operation in June, though he did not know if they would be ready by then. Unfortunately, the documents from the Presidential Archive in Moscow are quite sparse for the crucial period of April-June 1950 and prospects for gaining access to those records in the near future are not encouraging.5 Many important questions about how the North Korean offensive was planned thus remain obscure. However, a British Broadcasting Corporation documentary team that conducted research on the Korean War in Russia in 1994 has discovered a revealing report on the preparations for the attack and the first day of the operation. Written by Shtykov and addressed to the head of the special Soviet military mission sent to North Korea to oversee the operation, this report (document #14) reveals that troop concentration was carried out from June 12 to June 23, as prescribed in the General Staff's plan, and that Soviet advisers participated in reconnaissance and in planning the operation at the divisional level. However, Soviet advisers were apparently withdrawn from the front line before the attack began, with negative consequences for the efficiency of the operation. This accords with Khrushchev's recollection that Stalin pulled back Soviet advisers from the front at the last minute, out of fear that they might be taken prisoner and thus expose Soviet participation in the operation.6
Consistent with his withdrawal of Soviet advisers from the front, Stalin's queries to Shtykov on July 1 (document #15) indicate that he was agitated and nervous about the situation in Korea following the American entry into the war. Shtykov's reply (document #16) cautiously raises the question that was at the root of the Soviet leader's anxiety, namely the possibility that a disaster in Korea might draw Soviet troops into combat against American armed forces. Shtykov reports that Kim Il Sung and North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Hon Yong "understand the difficulties for Korea elicited by the entrance of the Americans into the war" and "are taking the necessary measures to stabilize human and material resources," though some in the DPRK leadership were inquiring about possible Soviet entry into the war.
We see that as early as the first week of July, Stalin began the strategy toward the war in Korea that he was to continue for the remainder of the conflict. In order to avoid committing Soviet troops to fight the Americans in Korea, he encouraged the Chinese leadership to take steps toward entering the war should the tide of battle turn against the DPRK. Chen Jian revealed in his recent book7 that the Chinese leadership decided on July 7 and 10 to send troops to the Korean border to prepare for possible intervention in Korea; discussion about sending troops to Korea thus began well before the UN advance into North Korea in early October. Stalin's telegram to the Soviet ambassador in Beijing on July 5 (document #18) reveals that in advance of those mid-July meetings, the Beijing leadership consulted with Stalin about the proposed troop transfer. Stalin informed PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai on July 5 that he approved of the plan and also promised to try to provide air cover for the Chinese troops.
Stalin's rather rude message to Mao Zedong on July 8 (document #21) appears to have been a further attempt to prod the Chinese to move toward entering the war. Stalin was also quite brusque in his message to Mao on July 13, indicating that he had not been informed whether the Chinese had decided to deploy troops on the Korean border and offering again to provide air cover. He also informed Beijing that he intended to train Chinese pilots in two to three months and to transfer the necessary equipment to them, presumably for use in Korea. On August 27, Stalin informed PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (document #26) that he would send 38 air force and air defense specialists to China. These advisers and the large amounts of equipment that accompanied them were the first installment of what became massive Soviet support in constructing an air force for the PRC, a process which continued throughout the Korean War.
Stalin's message to Kim Il Sung on 28 August 1950 (document #27) is particularly revealing of the Soviet leader's approach to the difficult situation created by American entry into the Korean War. While North Korea was suffering saturation bombing by American planes, Stalin exhorted Kim Il Sung to take courage from the example of the Red Army's triumph against great odds in the civil war of 1918-20 and the great war against Germany of 1941-45. He offered to send additional aircraft for the small North Korean air force, but did not suggest sending Soviet air force units or ground forces. Avoiding military confrontation with the United States remained the Soviet leader's foremost concern.
Stalin's difficult and dramatic negotiations with the Chinese leadership in October 1950 over the entry of Chinese armed forces into the war in Korea is the subject of a separate article in this issue by Alexandre Mansourov. I have therefore omitted those documents from this selection, but will point out that the terms of Chinese entry--that the PRC would provide troops, the USSR materiel and advisers, and China would pay the Soviet Union for all military supplies--engendered considerable bitterness on the part of the Chinese leadership. Stalin's approach to the armistice negotiations, which will be discussed below, and his insistence on timely and high payments for military supplies to China during the Korean War, thus constituted an important cause of the eventual collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance.
Resuming the story in late October 1950, document #31, the Politburo decision of 25 October 1950, suggests that the Soviet leadership worried that the United States might use the war in Korea as a pretext for rearming Japan. Stalin's continued fear of a resurgent Japan may seem surprising, but in 1947 the U.S. military had considered rearming Japan to buttress the forces available along the Soviet Pacific border, a move vigorously opposed by the Soviet representative to the Far Eastern Commission. Furthermore, two weeks after the North Korean attack on South Korea, U.S. Gen. Douglas MacArthur ordered the Japanese prime minister to create a "National Police Reserve" of 75,000 men, some of whom were, in fact, deployed to Korea. (At the same time, analogous moves toward constituting a West German military contribution to the Western alliance were stepped up.) We have no record of Japanese participation in the battles referred to in the Soviet statement cited here, but forty-six minesweepers with 1,200 Japanese military personnel were dispatched to the eastern coast of North Korea between 2 October and 10 December 1950, to clear the way for an amphibious assault by UN forces.8 Japanese participation never became a major issue during the Korean War, either militarily or diplomatically, but it does appear that one of Stalin's reasons for taking the risks associated with a North Korean offensive against South Korea was to eliminate the possibility that a resurgent Japan would be able to use southern Korea as a beachhead for an attack on the Soviet Union. (This argument also animates Stalin's arguments to Mao in early October 1950 in favor of Chinese entry into the war to save the North Korean regime; see documents accompanying Alexandre Mansourov's article.)
Despite Stalin's concern to avoid direct military conflict with the United States, he finally agreed to provide air cover for Chinese ground troops crossing into Korea. Given the intensity of American bombing, Chinese troops could hardly have entered the war without such cover and they did not have the means to provide it for themselves. On 1 November 1950, Soviet air force units first engaged American planes in air battles over the Yalu River bridge that was the route for Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) entering Korea. Stalin's military envoy to Mao, S.E. Zakharov, reported on 2 November 1950 (document #35) on the results of the first day of combat between Soviet and American pilots. Zakharov's report also reveals that Korean pilots were still flying in November 1950, from bases in Manchuria,9 and that American planes were bombing air bases in Manchuria as well as targets in North Korea.
Soviet air force units in Korea proved to be highly effective against American bombers and fighter planes.10 On 15 November 1950 (document #38), Mao expressed his appreciation to Stalin for the heroism of the Soviet pilots guarding the Yalu crossings, who had shot down 23 American planes in the previous 12 days. Mao's message also reveals that Stalin reinforced Soviet air support by sending additional MiG-15's to China and creating a command apparatus for the air corps. Over the next few months Soviet air force involvement in Korea grew to quite substantial proportions.11 Nonetheless, Stalin continued to attempt to minimize the damage to Soviet interests that might ensue from the presence of Soviet pilots in Korea by ordering the Soviet Air Force to train Chinese pilots as quickly as possible so that they could be sent to the front to replace Soviet air crews (documents #68, 74, 76).
In addition to providing air cover against American planes along the Korean-Manchurian border, the Soviet Union also played the critical role of providing military supplies and advisers for the Chinese and North Korean war effort. In this selection of documents I have included the requests for supplies and advisers from November 1950 through February 1951 (documents #36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 53, 62, 64), and then have limited the selection to only a few such requests for the remainder of the war (documents #72, 73, 91, 92, 106, 111). I should emphasize, however, that Chinese and North Korean requests for supplies and advisers constituted a large part of Stalin's correspondence with Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung until his death in March 1953. It is interesting to note that Stalin himself negotiated with Mao and Kim over the amounts of the various supplies that would be delivered, the schedule of delivery, and the terms of payment. Stalin's personal attention to the supply issue probably reflects the severity of the burden this role placed on Soviet production capacity, which was still rebuilding from the devastation of World War II.
These documents corroborate the impression produced by recently-disclosed Chinese sources that Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai played the central role in operational planning during the Korean War (e.g. documents #50, 54-57). They kept Stalin informed of the military situation and of proposed operations and asked his advice whenever a question of the "international situation" was involved, such as in planning the "fourth operation"--a possible offensive--in late January 1951 (document #56) or in general strategic planning in early June 1951 (documents #66, 67). The documents also reveal that Stalin offered advice on military planning whenever he wished, such as on 5 June 1951 (document #65), and that he intervened more often and more directly with the command of North Korean troops than with the Chinese (documents #19, 58, 59, 61).
While the Chinese leadership had primary responsibility for managing the battlefield, the Soviet leadership played the central role in formulating diplomatic strategy for the communist side during the war. We see that in November and December 1950 the Soviet Foreign Ministry advised Zhou Enlai regarding the best approach to take to the question of Chinese participation in the UN Security Council (document #37) and to a response to American proposals declaring China an aggressor in Korea (document #46). When UN representatives asked Chinese representatives in New York in December 1950 to inform them under what conditions China would accept a cease-fire in Korea, Zhou Enlai reported to Stalin his proposed terms and asked for the opinion of the Soviet government before responding (document #48).
Stalin's reply to Zhou and the Politburo directive the same day to UN Ambassador Vyshinsky suggest that the success of the Chinese People's Volunteers in turning back the American advance in November 1950 sharply altered Stalin's approach to the war. On December 7 the Politburo informed Vyshinsky (document #47) that his draft proposal for a cease-fire in Korea was "incorrect in the present situation, when American troops are suffering defeat and when the Americans are more and more often advancing a proposal about the cessation of military activity in Korea in order to win time and prevent the complete defeat of the American troops." With the unexpected and undoubtedly welcome sight of the supposedly fearsome American armed forces retreating before the troops of his junior ally, Stalin ordered Vyshinsky to propose instead terms that the Americans would surely reject. In the same vein, Stalin replied to Zhou (document #49) that it was not yet time "for China to show all its cards, while Seoul is still not liberated," and advised him to adopt the more cunning strategy of requesting US and UN opinions on conditions for an armistice. When the UN group presented its proposal on 11 January 1951, Zhou again turned to Stalin for "advice and consultation" (document #52), and in accordance with Stalin's recommendation the PRC rejected the UN proposal.
Stalin's telegram to Mao Zedong on 5 June 1951 (document #65) reveals the new attitude toward the war that Stalin adopted after Chinese successes on the battlefield removed the threat of an American advance toward Chinese and Soviet borders. He informed Mao that he agreed that "the war in Korea should not be speeded up, since a drawn out war, in the first place, gives the possibility to the Chinese troops to study contemporary warfare on the field of battle and in the second place shakes up the Truman regime in America and harms the military prestige of Anglo-American troops." We have no record of Mao's reaction to Stalin's enthusiasm for this costly "learning experience" for China and one may imagine that the Chinese leadership may have been less enthusiastic about the massive casualties suffered in Korea, which ran to many hundreds of thousands by the end of the war. At the same time, however, Mao's correspondence with Stalin indicates that the Chinese leader was in fact willing to continue the war until he obtained from the United States terms he considered acceptable. Russian records of Mao's correspondence with Stalin thus lend support to Chen Jian's argument that Mao Zedong intervened in Korea primarily in order to reassert China's place in the international order and to revive revolutionary momentum within China.12
Despite Stalin's interest in continuing the war in Korea, the serious losses suffered by Chinese and North Korean troops in their failed offensives of April and May 1951 forced the communist allies to consider opening negotiations with the UN command. On June 5 Soviet Ambassador to the UN Jacob Malik informed the American diplomat George F. Kennan that "the Soviet government wanted peace and wanted a peaceful solution of the Korean question--at the earliest possible moment" and advised the United States "to get in touch with the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists in this matter."13 A few days later Kim Il Sung and Gao Gang, a Chinese leader with close ties to the Soviet Union, went to Moscow to discuss the situation with Stalin (documents #67, 69-72). Mao Zedong considered it advisable to open negotiations with the UN command because for the next two months the Chinese and North Koreans would have to occupy a defensive position (documents #73, 74, 76). If the Chinese and North Korean forces could avoid facing an enemy offensive during this period, by August they would be strong enough to launch their own new offensive.
Stalin agreed with Mao that armistice negotiations were desirable at that time (see document #69) and instructed Moscow's ambassador to the United Nations to take the appropriate initiative.14 This evidence suggests that the "hawks" within the Truman Administration who opposed opening negotiations in Korea on the grounds that the enemy was only trying to buy time to build up its forces were, in fact, correct. From Mao's assessment of the condition of the Chinese and North Korean troops in the summer of 1951, it appears that if the UN forces had pushed their advantage in June and July 1951, before the Chinese had time to dig fortifications, they may well have advanced the line of the front, and hence the eventual border between the two Koreas. After August 1951 the CPV and PLA were sufficiently well dug in that the war remained a stalemate.
An examination of Chinese and North Korean strategy during the armistice negotiations, which lasted from July 1951 to July 1953, is beyond the scope of this essay, though the Presidential Archive documents provide extensive evidence on this subject. I will note only that it appears that while Mao Zedong opened negotiations in 1951 primarily in order to buy time to reinforce his position on the battlefield, his communications with Stalin in July and August 1951 (documents #84-88) suggest that if he had been able to secure satisfactory terms in the negotiations, he may have been willing to conclude an armistice. However, the documents reveal that Stalin consistently took a "hard line" toward the negotiations, advising Mao that since the Americans had an even greater need to conclude an armistice, the Chinese and North Koreans should "continue to pursue a hard line, not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations" (document #95).
The evidence presented below suggests that as the fighting dragged on through 1952, the North Koreans became increasingly desirous of ending the war (documents #102, 106). The Chinese approach to the war, however, seems to have been contradictory. On the one hand, Mao Zedong was clearly anxious to avoid undermining the prestige of the PRC by accepting unfavorable armistice terms (document #108). As Zhou Enlai explained to Stalin in a conversation in Moscow on 20 August 1952 (the transcript of which is published elsewhere in this issue of the Bulletin), the Chinese leadership felt that as a matter of principle it could not yield to the Americans on the issue of repatriation of POWs. Zhou also reported to Stalin that Mao believed that the war in Korea was advantageous to China because it kept the United States from preparing for a new world war. Specifically, by fighting the Americans in Korea, China was helping to delay the next world war by 15-20 years. On the other hand, however, Zhou stated toward the end of this conversation that if America makes some sort of compromise on the POW issue, the communist side should accept it.
We need additional records from China in order to determine more clearly the Chinese leadership's thinking regarding the war in Korea during the long months of armistice negotiations. However, from an internal report on the Korean War written by the Soviet Foreign Ministry in 1966 (published in Issue 3 [Fall 1993] of the Bulletin), it appears that by the time of Stalin's death in March 1953, Beijing was eager to bring the war to an end. According to this report, during conversations held while Zhou Enlai was in Moscow for Stalin's funeral, the PRC foreign minister "urgently proposed that the Soviet side assist the speeding up of an armistice." As the tortuously worded USSR Council of Ministers resolution of 19 March 1953 (document #112) reveals, ending the war in Korea was also a high priority for the post-Stalin leadership in Moscow; in the midst of the great anxiety and confusion following Stalin's death, the new leadership drafted and approved this major foreign policy decision in only two weeks. The evidence thus suggests that Stalin's desire to continue the war in Korea was a major factor in the prolongation of the war; immediately after his death the three communist allies took decisive steps to reach an armistice agreement.
The timing of the Council of Ministers' resolution also suggests that it was Stalin's death rather than U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons that finally brought a breakthrough in the armistice negotiations. The Eisenhower Administration later asserted that it finally broke the stalemate at Panmunjom by virtue of its "unmistakable warning" to Beijing that it would use nuclear weapons against China if an armistice were not reached--a claim that had great influence on American strategic thinking after 1953.15 However, Eisenhower's threats to use nuclear weapons were made in May 1953, two months after the Soviet government resolved to bring the war to an end. The Russian documents thus provide important new evidence for the debate over "nuclear diplomacy."16
The final two documents presented below provide intriguing information about Mao Zedong's attitude toward the Korean War and the effect the war had on his relations with Moscow. In a discussion with Soviet officials in Beijing on 28 July 1953 (document #114), Mao was remarkably bellicose, speaking of the war as though it had been a great victory for China. He even commented that "from a purely military point of view it would not be bad to continue to strike the Americans for approximately another year." Mao may have been mainly posturing before the Russians, part of a larger effort to redefine his relations with Moscow following the death of Stalin; the Soviet documents need to be combined with the new Chinese sources before one can draw firm conclusions about Mao's thinking. It is clear, however, as the excerpt from a conversation with the Soviet ambassador in Beijing in April 1956 (document #115) suggests, that the Korean War profoundly affected relations between the PRC and the USSR. Stalin desperately wanted Mao Zedong to pull his chestnuts out of the fire in Korea, but the PRC's stunning success against the formidable American foe, combined with Moscow's tightfistedness toward its ally, made the communist government in Beijing much less willing to tolerate subsequent Soviet demands.
As is apparent from the documents presented below and the others from this collection published in this issue, the documents declassified by the Presidential Archive greatly expand our knowledge of the Korean War and of Soviet foreign policy in general in the late Stalin years, particularly Soviet relations with the new communist government in China. It will be some time before these new sources can be adequately analyzed and integrated with documentary and memoir evidence from other countries. In the meantime, readers may wish to consult the following recent publications using other new sources from China and Russia in order to place this new evidence in a broader context: Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Thomas Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams," International Security 17:1 (Summer 1992), 122-54; Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Michael Hunt, "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951," Political Science Quarterly 107: 3 (Fall 1992), 453-78; William Stueck, The Korean War, An International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Zhang Shu Guang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1995).
1. Photocopies of these documents have been deposited at the National Security Archive in Washington DC, located in The Gelman Library (7th fl.), George Washington University, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, DC 20037 (tel.: (202) 994-7000). The National Security Archive, a non-governmental organization devoted to facilitating increased access to declassified records on international relations, is open to all researchers. Copies of this collection will also be available at Columbia University.
2. "New Findings on the Korean War," CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 14-18; and "To Attack or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung and the Prelude to War," CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 1,2-9; and "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 2:4 (Winter 1993), 425-458.
3. See Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 149.
4. Although Kim Il Sung secured Mao's approval before launching the attack on South Korea, he did not inform Mao of the specific plan for the invasion or the timing of the attack. The North Korean leadership informed Beijing about the military operation only on June 27, after the KPA had already occupied Seoul. See Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 134.
5. Members of the Russian declassification committee for Korean War documents have reported that further records regarding the preparations for the military offensive against South Korea in the spring of 1950 are not in the Presidential Archive and have not been located.
6. Khrushchev recorded that when he asked Stalin about this "incomprehensible" order, the Soviet leader replied sharply: "It's too dangerous to keep our advisers there. They might be taken prisoner. We don't want there to be evidence for accusing us of taking part in this business. It's Kim Il Sung's affair." See Nikita Khrushchev (Strobe Talbott, ed.), Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970), 370.
7. Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War, 135-141.
8. See Meirion and Susie Harries, Sheathing the Sword: The Demilitarization of Japan (London: Hamish Hamilton; Heinemann, 1989), 228-42.
9. This contradicts the widespread conclusion that the DPRK air force had been eliminated in the first weeks of the war. DPRK air units ceased to operate over North Korea after the first few weeks of the war, but it appears from this report that at least a portion of the air force was withdrawn to Manchuria. For a discussion of the role of the North Korean air force, see, e.g., Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 255.
10. I am grateful to Mark O'Neill, who is writing a dissertation on the Soviet air force in the Korean War based on records from the General Staff archive, for assistance in interpreting the documents on military operations.
11. Gen. Georgii Lobov, who commanded the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps in Korea, stated in an interview in 1991 that approximately 70,000 Soviet pilots, technicians and gunners served in the corps over the course of the war. See "Blank Spots in History: In the Skies Over North Korea," JPRS Report, JPRS-UAC-91-004, p. 3.
12. Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War , 211-223.
13. Kennan to Matthews, 5 June 1951, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1951, vol. 7 (pt.1), pp. 507-511.
14. See Malik's address over the UN radio network on 23 June 1951, ibid., 546-547.
15. James Sheply, "How Dulles Averted War," Life, 16 January 1956, 70-72; and Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1963), 179-180.
16. For discussion of the debate over the utility of nuclear threats in the Korean War see Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War," International Security 13:3 (Winter 1988/89),50-91; and Rosemary Foot, "Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict," International Security 13:3 (Winter 1988/89), 92-112.

NOTE ON TRANSLATION: In translating these documents I have retained the style of the Russian texts, which in most cases is the cumbersome, indirect, bureaucratic prose characteristic of official Soviet documents. The telegrams from Mao Zedong to Stalin in 1951 and 1952 are written in particularly poor Russian; I have kept as much to the original text as possible while still rendering the prose intelligible. The numbers of the ciphered telegrams are given when they are legible, but in many cases the "DECLASSIFIED" stamp obscured the number of the telegram. Personal names and place names are given in the standard English spelling wherever possible; otherwise they are transliterated from the Russian. An index of abbreviations and identifications of the most important persons mentioned are provided after the documents. Dates are given in the Russian manner: day, month, year. Note on archival citations: Those documents that were provided by the Russian Government to South Korea have a citation to the Russian Foreign Ministry archives (AVPRF) as well as to the Russian Presidential Archive (APRF); both archives are located in Moscow.--K.W.

1. 31 January 1950, ciphered telegram, USSR Ambassador to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) T.F. Shtykov to Soviet leader Joseph Stalin re meeting with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung
Ciphered telegram Strictly secret
From Pyongyang
To Comrade Stalin, I.V.
On 30 January I had a meeting with Comrade Kim Il Sung, in accordance with your order. After referring to the conversation that took place on January 17 during the lunch at [North Korean Foreign Minister] Pak Hon Yong's, I relayed precisely the contents of the first point of your orders.
Kim Il Sung received my report with great satisfaction. Your agreement to receive him and your readiness to assist him in this matter made an especially strong impression. Kim Il Sung, apparently wishing once more to reassure himself, asked me if this means that it is possible to meet with Comrade Stalin on this question. I answered that from this communication it follows that Comrade Stalin is ready to receive you. Kim Il Sung further stated that he will prepare himself for the meeting.
Regarding the question of delivering lead from Korea to the USSR, I read the second point of your order. Kim answered that he will take all necessary measures to secure the delivery to the USSR from Korea of the quantity of lead indicated by you. He promised to work out all necessary measures regarding this question in the course of 10-15 days.
31.I.50. [T.F.] SHTYKOV
[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (hereafter APRF), Listy 123-124, Fond and Opis not given; and Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (hereafter AVPRF), Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 92-93]

2. 7 February 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung
Ciphered telegram Strictly secret
Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Vyshinsky, Copy.
From Pyongyang, No. 4040. 10 hours 10 minutes. 8.II.1950
Special File
To Vyshinsky
On 4 February I had a meeting with Kim Il Sung at his request. During the meeting Kim Il Sung raised the following questions:
1. Can they adopt a central committee decision about issuing a loan, about which he earlier asked my advice[?] They have already calculated the loan at 2 billion won. They have already prepared an example of a bond. He asked agreement to send their representatives to Moscow with draft bonds in order to formulate orders for these bonds. I answered that I had communicated Kim Il Sung's request to Moscow, but had still not received an answer.
2. Kim Il Sung asked my advice about whether they can proceed toward forming three additional infantry divisions, so that the total number of the army will be brought to ten divisions. I answered that this question is large and serious, that before adopting a decision you must think through whether you have the necessary material resources for this. I also need time to think through this question before I give you advice on this measure.
3. Kim Il Sung asked me if he can appeal to Comrade Stalin with a request to use in 1950 the credit the Soviet government had allocated for 1951. With this credit they would like to buy in the Soviet Union arms for the three infantry divisions they intend to form. I answered that I will report this question to my government.
4. Kim Il Sung further communicated that they intend to call a session of the Supreme People's Assembly for February 25 with the following agenda:
1. Regarding the budget for 1950. 2. Regarding the criminal code. 3. Regarding the results of the fulfillment of the national economic plan in 1949. They still do not have a firm decision regarding whether to raise the three questions.
Kim Il Sung reported that he had commissioned Pak Hon Yong to write a request to the Soviet government about sending a group of textile workers to the Soviet Union in order to prepare them to work on the Soviet equipment that is arriving. I answered that as soon as I receive his letter I will report it to my government.
I ask your orders about what to answer Kim Il Sung regarding the first three questions raised by him [as reported] in this telegram.
7.II.50 SHTYKOV
In the margins Stalin wrote "it is possible" beside points 1, 2 and 3, "we don't object" beside point 4 and "let him write it" beside the last paragraph. He wrote a note at the top to Malenkov to "give an answer today."
[Source: APRF, Listy 125-126, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 145-146]

3. 10 February 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung
Ciphered telegram Strictly secret
Copying prohibited
From Pyongyang
To Vyshinsky
Today, February 10, I visited Kim Il Sung and in accordance with your order verbally transmitted to him the answer to his questions of February 4 of this year. Kim Il Sung received my communication enthusiastically and several times asked me to communicate to Comrade Stalin his gratitude for his assistance.
I promised to present a letter to the government of the USSR within three days concerning all the questions touched upon in your telegram.
10/II-50. SHTYKOV
[Source: APRF, List 129, Fond and Opis not given]

4. 23 February 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Maj. Gen. A.M. Vasilevsky, Head of Soviet Military Advisory Group in DPRK
Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret
Copying prohibited
From Pyongyang
To Vasilevsky, Copy to Vyshinsky.
Lieutenant-General Vasiliev has arrived and has taken over the responsibility of main military adviser of the Korean People's Army. He has familiarized himself with the position in the staff and units of the army.
In connection with this I understand that the functions of main military adviser are removed from me.
I ask you to confirm.
23.II.50 SHTYKOV
[Source: APRF, List 130, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 148]

5. 9 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky transmitting note from Kim Il Sung to Soviet Government
Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret
Copying is prohibited
From Pyongyang.
To Vyshinsky.
I transmit the text of a note received from the chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK:
"The Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People's Democratic Republic reports to you about the following:
In 1950 the Korean People's Democratic Republic, in order to strengthen the people's army and to fully equip it with arms, ammunition and technical equipment, asked the Soviet government to send to Korea military-technical equipment in the amount of 120-150 million rubles, in accordance with an application made earlier to the Government of the USSR.
The Korean People's Democratic Republic correspondingly will deliver to the Soviet Union this year:
9 tons of gold -- 53,662,900 rubles
40 tons of silver -- 1,887,600 rubles
15,000 tons of monazite concentrate -- 79,500,000 rubles
In all a sum of 133,050,500 rubles.
Korea is interested in the soonest possible receipt of the goods indicated in this application.
I ask you to inform the Soviet government of our request.
Kim Il Sung
Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People's Democratic Republic."
9.III.50 SHTYKOV
[Source: APRF, Listy 131-132, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 149-150]

6. 12 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Vyshinsky to Soviet Ambassador in Pyongyang (Shtykov) transmitting message to Kim Il Sung
[handwritten]
MID USSR Top Secret
Copying is Prohibited
Ciphered telegram
To Pyongyang
To Soviet Ambassador
Communicate to Kim Il Sung, in answer to his letter of 10 February, that the Soviet Government will satisfy the request of the government of the DPRK about using in 1950 a portion of the credit for 1951 that was allocated by the Soviet Union to Korea in accordance with the Agreement of 17 March 1949.
Telegraph the fulfillment.
A. Vyshinsky
[Source: APRF, page 141, fond and opis not given]

7. 16 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky transmitting 14 March 1950 message from Kim Il Sung
Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret
Copying is Prohibited
From Pyongyang
To Vyshinsky.
I transmit the note we received on 14 March 1950 from the chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung:
"I have the honor to inform you of the following:
In connection with the agreement of the Government of the USSR to allocate to Korea in 1950 a portion of the credit for 1951 in the amount of 70,700,000 rubles, the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic would like to acquire with this sum arms, ammunition and military-technical equipment for the Korean People's Army in the amounts indicated in the attached [list].
The Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic hopes that the Government of the USSR, understanding well the needs of the young Korean Republic, will complete the delivery of all the special goods in the shortest period.
Kim Il Sung
Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People's Democratic Republic
A copy of the note was transmitted by me to the trade representative of the USSR in Korea. I will send the original note by diplomatic post. The arms and military equipment indicated in the attached [list] will go to the formation of 3 divisions.
16.III.50 SHTYKOV
attached is a seven page list, divided into sections for artillery armaments, ammunition, [illegible], engineering equipment, military-medical equipment, and military aviation supplies.
[Source: APRF, Listy 133-140, fond and opis not given]

8. 18 March 1950, message, Stalin to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov)
PYONGYANG
To SHTYKOV
Transmit to Kim Il Sung the following answer from Comrade Stalin:
"First. I received your communication of March 4 about agreement to send the indicated amount of lead to the Soviet Union. I thank you for the assistance. As concerns the equipment and materials you request, and also the specialists in lead industry, the Soviet Government has resolved to fully satisfy your request.
Second. I have also received your proposal of 9 March about the delivery to you of arms, ammunition and technical equipment for the people's army of Korea. The Soviet government has decided also to satisfy fully this request of yours.
With respect I. STALIN".
[Source: APRF, List 142, Fond and Opis not given]

9. 21 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung
Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret
Copying Prohibited
From Pyongyang
To Vyshinsky.
In accordance with your order on March 20 I had a meeting with Kim Il Sung, at which [DPRK Foreign Minister] Pak Hon Yong was present. During the meeting I transmitted to Kim the text of the telegram of Comrade Stalin.
During this meeting Kim asked me to transmit to Comrade Stalin his request that he, together with Pak Hon Yong, would like have a meeting with Comrade Stalin at the beginning of April.
They want to make the trip to Moscow and the meeting with Comrade Stalin unofficially, in the manner as [it was done] in 1945.
Kim Il Sung said further that they are completing the preparation of all materials for the trip and intend to raise the following questions at the meeting with Comrade Stalin:
1. About the path and methods of unification of the south and the north of the country.
2. About the prospects for the economic development of the country.
3. Also possibly several party questions.
I ask your order.
21.III.50 SHTYKOV
[Source: APRF, Listy 143-144, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 94-95]

10. 24 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung
Ciphered telegram. Strictly secret.
From Pyongyang.
To Vyshinsky.
On March 24 I visited Kim Il Sung and communicated to him that Comrade Stalin has agreed to receive him and [Foreign Minister] Pak Hon Yong.
Kim Il Sung plans to leave Korea for Moscow on March 30 of this year. I consider it advisable to arrange a special plane for transporting Kim and Pak to Moscow. For this purpose I request a corresponding order to apportion a plane. The designated plane should arrive in Pyongyang on March 29 of this year. In case it is not possible to send a plane, the departure from Korea can be organized by naval transport from Seisin to Vladivostok. From Vladivostok to Moscow [Kim and Pak can travel] by train in a special car.
Kim intends to take with him to Moscow as an interpreter Mun Il, who was interpreter during the negotiations in Moscow, and the personal adjutant of So Chen Diu, who was also with him in Moscow in 1949.
I request an order regarding whether it is necessary for someone from the embassy to accompany Kim to Moscow.
I ask for corresponding orders.
24.III.50 Shtykov
[Source: APRF, Listy 146-147, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 96-97]

11. 10 April 1950, ciphered telegram, Soviet representative Aleksei Ignatieff in Pyongyang Ignatiev to Vyshinsky
Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret
Copying Prohibited
From Pyongyang
To Vyshinsky.
The deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK has reported to me about the following:
1. A report to Kim Il Sung was received from the ambassador of the DPRK in the Chinese People's Republic Li Zhou-yuan in which he reports about a meeting between Mao Zedong and Li Zhou-yuan that took place in Beijing at the end of March 1950.
In the conversation between Mao Zedong and Li Zhou-yuan, at the initiative of the latter, the question of a meeting between Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong was discussed.
Mao Zedong responded positively to the question of a meeting with Kim Il Sung and selected the end of April or the beginning of May of this year as the approximate time for this meeting.
Mao Zedong connected the proposed meeting with the question of the unification of Korea, indicating in this regard that if there is a concrete plan for the unification of Korea, then the meeting should be organized secretly [not openly], but if there is not yet such a plan for unification of Korea, then the meeting with Kim Il Sung can be conducted officially.
Li Zhou-yuan has not given a concrete answer to the question of the time and form of the meeting, referring to the fact that Kim Il Sung is presently undergoing medical treatment. [Ed. note: Kim was making a secret visit to Moscow.] Further, Mao said in the conversation with Li Zhou-yuan that if a third world war begins, Korea will not escape participation in it, therefore the Korean People's Democratic Republic should prepare its armed forces.
In the conversation with Li Zhou-yuan, Mao Zedong expressed the wish to develop wider trade between the Chinese People's Republic and the DPRK.
2. Kim Ch'aek has reported that Kim Dar Sen, the leader of the partisan detachments in the south of Korea whom the southern press and radio have repeatedly officially reported as killed in battles with punitive units of the South Korean army, arrived in Pyongyang from South Korea on April 3. Kim Dar Sen came to North Korea to report about the position of the partisan movement in South Korea and to receive orders on this question.
Kim Ch'aek asked me to transmit the above indicated questions to Kim Il Sung through Comrade Shtykov.
10.IV.50. [A.] IGNATIEV
[Source: APRF, Listy 148-149, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 98-99]

12. 25 April 1950, ciphered telegram, Ignatiev to Vyshinsky
Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret
Copying Prohibited
From Pyongyang
To Vyshinsky.
25 April at 16:00 hours local time Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon Yong arrived in Seisin (North Korean) from Voroshilov by plane. Both feel well.
25.IV.50 IGNATIEV
[Source: APRF, List 150, fond and opis not given]

13. 12 May 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung
Ciphered telegram Strictly secret
Copying prohibited
From Pyongyang
To Vyshinsky
At the request of Kim Il Sung, on May 12 I had a meeting with him and [Foreign Minister] Pak Hon Yong. During the conversation Kim Il Sung reported to me that upon his return from Moscow he received a letter from Li Zhou-yuan (ambassador to China), in which he reported about a meeting that took place with Mao Zedong and [PRC Foreign Minister] Zhou Enlai. During this meeting the question of the necessity of a meeting between Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong was discussed. Zhou Enlai proposed that the meeting have an official character. Mao, turning toward Li as if asking when you intend to begin the unification of the country, without waiting for an answer stated that if you intend to begin military operations against the south in the near future, then they should not meet officially. In such a case the trip should be unofficial.
Mao Zedong added further that the unification of Korea by peaceful means is not possible, solely military means are required to unify Korea. As regards the Americans, there is no need to be afraid of them. The Americans will not enter a third world war for such a small territory.
Kim Il Sung reported further that since Li Zhou-yuan did not have a commission from the Central Committee to meet with Mao Zedong and to discuss questions about his meeting, i.e. Kim Il Sung's, with Mao Zedong, they decided to summon Li Zhou-yuan and give him corresponding rebukes and instructions.
Li Zhou-yuan came to Pyongyang and on May 10 left for Beijing with corresponding commissions.
Today, May 12, Li Zhou-yuan reported that he met with Mao Zedong, who agreed to the arrival of Kim Il Sung at the time indicated by him. Kim Il Sung reported that they intend to leave for Beijing in the morning of May 13 and asked me if the plane coming for him will be ready by this time. I answered that the plane is ready.
Kim Il Sung further reported that they decided to go to China with Pak Hon Yong, that they have not discussed the question of a meeting with Mao Zedong in the Central Committee, that he has only spoken about this question with Kim Ch'aek (member of the Politburo).
Kim Il Sung reported to me that they intend to discuss roughly the following questions with Mao Zedong:
1. To inform about their intentions about unifying the country by military means and to report about the results of the discussions on this question in Moscow.
2. To exchange opinions on the question of the conclusion of a trade agreement between Korea and China. He intends to propose that they sign a trade agreement in the nearest future, but that they sign an agreement about friendship after the unification of the country.
3. To inform Mao about several questions which were placed under discussion with Comrade Stalin in Moscow and about the establishment of closer communications between the Central Committee of the labor party of Korea and the communist party of China.
4. To exchange opinions on several questions which interest both Korea and China, such as the electrical station at Suiho, Koreans who live in China and so forth.
Kim further asked my advice, about what kind of questions he should raise before Mao Zedong from the point of view of assistance in the intended operation. I declined to answer, stating that it is clearer to him, what he has insufficiencies in and what the Chinese can help him with. Then Kim Il Sung answered that he intended to ask for ammunition for the Japanese and American arms which the divisions that arrived from China have and for some number of horses. However, after a conversation with the chief of staff of the army, who reported that they have more than 3 b.k. [boekomplekt, standard load of ammunition] of ammunition, he decided not to raise these questions. He stated that he doesn't have more requests for Mao about assistance, since all his requests were satisfied in Moscow and the necessary and sufficient assistance was given him there.
Kim Il Sung reported to me that with regard to the question of the preparation of the operation he had given all necessary orders to the chief of the general staff, who already has begun to implement them, that his wish is to begin the operation in June, but he is still not convinced that they will manage it in this period.
13 May at 5:20 local time Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon Yong flew to Beijing.
12.V.50 SHTYKOV
[Source: APRF, Listy 151-154, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 100-103]
[Ed. note: For the texts of an exchange of messages between the Chinese leadership and Stalin on 13-14 May 1950, during Kim Il Sung's secret visit to Beijing and concerning his plans to attack South Korea, see CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 60-61.]

14. 26 June 1950, top secret report on military situation by Shtykov to Comrade Zakharov
Top Secret
To Comrade Zakharov
([transmit] in person only)
I report about the preparation and course of the military operations of the Korean People's Army.
The concentration of the People's Army in the region near the 38th parallel began on June 12 and was concluded on June 23, as was prescribed in the plan of the General Staff. The redeployment of troops took place in an orderly fashion, without incident.
The intelligence service of the enemy probably detected the troop redeployment, but we managed to keep the plan and the time of the beginning of troop operations secret.
The planning of the operation at the divisional level and the reconnaissance of the area was carried out with the participation of Soviet advisers.
All preparatory measures for the operation were completed by June 24th. On June 24th divisional commanders were given orders about "D"[day] and "H"[hour].
The political order of the Minister of Defense was read to the troops, which explained that the South Korean army had provoked a military attack by violating the 38th parallel and that the government of the DPRK had given an order to the Korean People's Army to go over to the counterattack.
The order to counter-attack was met with great enthusiasm by the soldiers and officers of the Korean People's Army.
The troops went to their starting positions by 24:00 hours on June 24th. Military operations began at 4 hours 40 minutes local time. Artillery preparation was accompanied in the course of 20-40 minutes by direct fire and a ten-minute artillery barrage. The infantry rose up and went on the attack in good spirits. In the first three hours individual units and formations advanced from 3 to 5 kilometers.
The attack of the troops of the People's Army took the enemy completely by surprise.
The enemy put up strong resistance only in the direction of Ongjin, Kaizin and Seoul. The enemy began to put up a more organized resistance after 12:00 on the first day.
On the first day of battle the following towns were taken: Osin (Ongjin direction), Kaesong, Sinyuri--(map 1:1,000.000 published by the General Staff in 1943).
In the Sunsen direction units of the P.A. [People's Army] advanced 12 kilometers.
On the eastern coast [they advanced] 8 kilometers.
On the very first day the DPRK navy made two landings on the coast of the Sea of Japan. The first landing party was in the Korio area and consisted of two battalions of naval infantry and around a thousand partisans. The second landing group was in the region of Urutsyn and consisted of 600 partisans.
The landings took place at 5 hours 25 minutes and were carried out successfully.
The group of partisans took the city of Urutsyn and a number of districts adjoining it.
The landings were carried out with a battle between warships of the People's Army and ships of the South Korean army. As a result of the battle one Southern trawler was sunk and one was damaged. The DPRK fleet had no losses.
On June 26 troops of the People's Army continued the attack and, with fighting, advanced deep into the territory of South Korea.
During June 26 (left to right) the Ongjin peninsula and Kaisin peninsula were completely cleared and units of the 6th division made a forced crossing of the bay and took the populated point in the direction of Kimpo airport.
In the Seoul direction, the 1st and 4th divisions took the cities of Bunsan and Tongducheb and the 2nd division took the provincial center Siunsen.
On the coast of the Sea of Japan the advance has continued. The port of Tubuiri has been taken.
During the course of the day there has been no communication with the 12th Infantry Division, moving in the direction of Kosen, or with the 3rd Infantry Division and the mechanized brigade attacking through Sinyuri in the direction toward Geisif.
Conclusions regarding the North.
It is necessary to note the following substantial insufficiencies in the operations of the People's Army:
1. With the beginning of military actions and the forward advance of units and formations, staff communication was lost from top to bottom. The general staff of the People's Army already on the first day did not direct the battle, since it did not have firm communication with a single division.
The commanders of units and formations are not trying to establish communications with the senior staff, command posts from combat level and higher change the senior staff without permission, the General Staff still has not established communications with the brigade operating along the eastern coast or with the 12th Infantry Division.
2. The command staff of the KPA does not have battle experience, after the withdrawal of Soviet military advisers they organized the battle command poorly, they use artillery and tanks in battle badly and lose communications.
3. However, our military advisers note great enthusiasm in the units of the Korean People's army and a general aspiration to fulfill their allotted tasks.
4. The political mood among the people of North Korea in relation to the beginning of military operations is characterized by a general enthusiasm, by faith in the government of the DPRK and belief in the victory of the Korean People's Army.
On 26 June KIM IL SUNG made an appeal to the Korean people in the name of the government of the DPRK, in which he described the situation that has been created in the country and laid out the tasks for the defeat of the enemy and the unification of Korea.
5. The Command of the Korean People's Army is taking measures to put right the troop communications and the organization of the battle command. To this end the Army Command Post has been moved to the Tepuges area. The War Minister, the chief of the General Staff and the main military adviser, along with a group of officers, will go out to the Command Post.
Conclusions regarding the South.
The first two days of military operations have shown the following:
1. The enemy is putting up resistance and while fighting is retreating deep into the territory of South Korea, mass taking of prisoners from the South Korean army has not been noted.
2. The South Korean puppet authorities have begun to throw in troops from deep in the rear and are trying to halt the advance of the People's Army.
3. In the first day the attack of the People's Army caused confusion in the South. The South Korean authorities and the ambassador of the USA personally in their radio speeches called on the people of South Korea to stay calm. The staff of the South Korean army is broadcasting false reports about the successes of the South Korean army.
SHTYKOV
No. 358/sh
26.6.50.
[Source: collection of Soviet military documents obtained in 1994 by the British Broadcasting Corporation for a BBC TimeWatch documentary titled "Korea, Russia's Secret War," to be broadcast in the UK and the USA in 1996]

15. 1 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang (Shtykov)
8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR
Ciphered Telegram No. 34691/sh.
Pyongyang. Soviet Ambassador.
1. You do not report anything about what kind of plans the Korean command has. Does it intend to push on? Or has it decided to stop the advance. In our opinion the attack absolutely must continue and the sooner South Korea is liberated the less chance there is for intervention.
2. Communicate also how the Korean leaders regard the attacks on North Korean territory by American planes. Are they not frightened or do they continue to hold firm[?]
Does the Korean government intend to make an open statement of protest against the attacks and the military intervention? In our opinion, this should be done.
4. [sic] We have decided to fulfill fully by July 10 the Koreans' requests for delivery of ammunition and other military equipment. Report about this to KIM IL SUNG.
FYN-SI [Stalin].
No. 362/sh
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov
1.7.50
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, List 104 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, l. 107]

16. 1 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re political mood on North Korea
Ciphered telegram No. 405809
From Pyongyang. Sent 2.7.50 04.00. Received 2.7.50 05.47.
Sent to the 8th Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. 2.7.50 05.55
By wire.
Extremely Urgent.
To Comrade FYN SI [Stalin]
To No. 362.
I report about the political mood of the northerners in connection with the intervention of the Americans.
With the beginning of the successful military operations of the People's Army, and especially after the liberation of the city of Seoul, the mood of the population was characterized by great general political enthusiasm.
The population of the liberated regions in the main greeted the People's Army warmly and in every way cooperated with the measures it took. Organs of power are being created everywhere--people's committees, social-political organizations, they have restored production and trade. At this time even the reactionary elements did not take action against the measures of the government of the DPRK and the People's Army.
The successful attack of the People's Army activated the partisans, at present the partisan movement is developing widely in the rear of the South Korean army.
However, in connection with the widespread American propaganda over the radio, which is directed against the DPRK, and the frequent attacks by American planes on population points, industrial and military sites in North and South Korea, the political mood of the population is somewhat worsening.
Individual attitudes of lack of belief in the final victory have appeared, and in the liberated regions a certain (small) portion of the population is taking a wait and see position.
The leadership of the DPRK and the People's Army (Kim Il Sung, Pak Hon-Yong, Pak Il U, Kim Bek, Tsoi En Gen, Kan Gen) correctly evaluate the complicated military-political situation in Korea, believe in full victory and are directing all efforts toward a subsequent broad attack on the south of Korea.
KIM IL SUNG and PAK HON-YONG understand the difficulties for Korea elicited by the entrance of the Americans into the war against the DPRK and in connection with this they are taking the necessary measures to stabilize human and material resources for the war.
KIM IL SUNG asked my opinion about forming additional infantry, tank, and naval units and formations. They intend to introduce universal military service in the DPRK.
However, some portion of the leading figures, including KIM TU-BONG, KHON MEN KHI are speaking about the difficulties of conducting a war against the Americans with the forces of Korea and in a cautious way have tried to ascertain from KIM IL SUNG the position of the Soviet Union on this question. (The secretary of KIM IL SUNG reported to me these facts, about a conversation of KIM TU-BONG and KHON MEN KHI with KIM IL SUNG.)
The rightist and centrist figures that are entering the government of the DPRK are supporting all measures of the government, but so far are not displaying the necessary direction of activity in the mobilization of their parties in the south of the country.
I communicated to KIM IL SUNG that the government of the USSR has satisfied his request for arms and ammunition.
The general situation in the KNP [Korean People's Republic, apparently a misspelling of DPRK] continues to remain favorable and makes it possible to continue the active offensive of the People's Army.
No. 423/Sh. SHTYKOV.
I.7.50.
Copies to Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, File of 8th Department.
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, Listy 105-107 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 107-110]

17. 4 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re meeting with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 405840/sh.
From Pyongyang Sent 4.7.50 0:05
Received 4.7.50 3:55
Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 4.7.50 4:10
To Comrade FYN-SI [Stalin].
Today July 3 I met with KIM IL SUNG and PAK HON-YONG.
At the beginning of the conversation KIM IL SUNG described the situation at the front. In his opinion the troops are moving very slowly, especially in the Central direction. The troop crossing was disorganized, although there was a minister in place there. He expressed dissatisfaction with his [the minister's] work.
Further, noting the seriousness of the situation at the front and in the liberated territories and the danger of landings by American troops in the rear or at North Korean ports or airborne landings of troops, he asked me to report to you his request for quick delivery of arms in the following amounts: 50,000 rifles; 5,000 PPSh sub-machine guns, 5,000 PPS [sub-machine guns]; 1,500 light machine guns; 350 heavy machine guns; 200 82mm mortars; 78 120mm mortars, 80 76mm ZIS-3 artillery pieces; 24 122mm howitzers; 60 37mm anti- aircraft guns; 120 machine guns; 500 trucks.
All these arms are needed for the formation of two divisions, 12 battalions of marines and for the formation of security detachments.
Because of American air attacks on the railroad stations in the region of Kanko, Seisin, he asked that the arms be sent on an accelerated schedule through Manchuria [along the route of] Andong-Singisiu-Pyongyang.
He also communicated that they have begun fitting out reserve regiments and 2 tank brigades and that these need arms and tanks.
Further in the conversation he asked advice about how better to organize troop command in the complicated situation. Since the People's Army is fighting against American troops, he considers it necessary to strengthen the leadership of the army.
Further he asked advice about how better to organize troop command and what kind of organizational command structure to choose so that the General Staff is brought closer to the troops.
After consulting with General VASILIEV we proposed the following structure:
1. To create two army groups headed by Military Councils composed of: a commander, a member of the Military Council and a chief of staff.
To place 4-6 units under the command of each army group.
2. To create a front headquarters headed by a commander of the front, a chief of staff and a member of the Military Council of the front.
The front headquarters should be created from [the facilities and personnel of] the General Staff.
3. To preserve the Ministry of National Defense, since it already exists only in a reduced form.
The Ministry's task should be the supply of combat troops with everything needed (foodstuffs, fuel, transport, ammunition) as well as the training of reserves, new troop formation and the organization of anti-aircraft defense for the northern part of the republic.
4. To appoint Kim Il Sung as Supreme Commander of troops. He agreed with our proposals.
The restructuring will proceed without harm to the military operations on the front.
He then asked our opinion about how best to arrange the disposition of commanding cadres.
From my part I proposed to appoint the following group commanders: Deputy Minister in charge of artillery Mu Den for the left flank group, and for the commander of the right flank group Kim Koo, Deputy Chief of the General Staff (presently commanding an operational group). To appoint as commander of the front the Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers and Minister of Industry, Kim Cha'ek (he knows military affairs, was a partisan and served in the Chinese brigade in Khabarovsk, is a very strong-willed, thoughtful and brave man).
To appoint as Chief of Staff of the front Kan Gen, who is now Chief of the General Staff.
The Minister of National Defense will remain in his post. He will manage the formation of new units and the organization of anti-landing defense, and also supplying troops with everything needed.
They want this measure to be passed through the military committee on July 4 or 5. I judge that in this complicated situation this measure will yield positive results.
The staff of the front will move to Seoul in the near future.
I ask your permission:
1. To have two advisers in every army group (adviser for the group commander and adviser for the artillery commander).
2. I ask your permission for the main military adviser Comrade VASILIEV to go to Seoul with a group of officers, together with the staff of the front, and to be permanently located there with the staff.
3. I ask you to hasten the resolution of the questions touched on.
SHTYKOV
No. 439/sh.
4.7.50.
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin.
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, Listy 105-107 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 111-114]

18. 5 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (via Soviet ambassador to the People's Republic of China [PRC] N.V. Roshchin)
Ciphered telegram No. 3172
Beijing. Soviet Ambassador.
To your No. 1112-1126.
Transmit to Zhou Enlai:
1. We agree with the opinion of the Chinese comrades regarding the mediation of India on the question of the entry of people's China into the membership of the UN.
2. We consider it correct to concentrate immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteer actions in North Korea in case the enemy crosses the 38th parallel. We will try to provide air cover for these units.
3. Your report about flights of Soviet planes over Manchurian territory is not confirmed. An order was given not to allow such flights.
FILIPPOV [Stalin]
No. 373/sh
5.7.50
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, List 79 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 115]

19. 6 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Shtykov
8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 35678
Pyongyang. To Comrade Shtykov.
To No. 439/sh
1. The arms will be sent through Manchuria, Andong, Singisiu.
2. Concerning the location of the chief military adviser VASILIEV, we consider it more useful for him to be in Pyongyang.
3. We will give fully the arms, tanks and other military equipment for 2 divisions, 2 tank brigades and 12 battalions, but we consider that the main thing is not this but to fill out the existing divisions and to increase their strength approximately to 12,000. It is necessary to have attached to the divisions an apparatus for the formation of troops, which would receive the reinforcements, check and train them and after this, transfer them to reinforce the divisions. This is the main thing.
FYN-SI [Stalin]
No. 374/sh
6.7.50
copies: Stalin (2), Bulganin
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, List 140 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 116]

20. 8 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin), transmitting letter from Kim Il Sung to Stalin
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 405976/sh
From Pyongyang. Sent 8.7.50. 9:26
Received 8.7.50 11:15
Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 8.7.50 11:35.
By telegraph.
To Comrade FYN-SI [Stalin].
I received the following letter from KIM IL SUNG addressed to us.
"To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Generalissimo Comrade Stalin, I.V.
I ask that you accept the expression of deepest respect and gratitude for the invaluable assistance which you, Comrade Stalin, continually render to our people in their struggle for independence.
Being confident of your desire to help the Korean people rid themselves of the American imperialists, I am obliged to appeal to you with a request to allow the use of 25-35 Soviet military advisers in the staff of the front of the Korean Army and the staffs of the 2nd Army Group, since the national military cadres have not yet sufficiently mastered the art of commanding modern troops.
Faithfully, KIM IL SUNG, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers DPRK.
Pyongyang. 8 July 1950.
SHTYKOV
No. 481/sh
8.7.50
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, Listy 143-144 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 151]

21. 8 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador Roshchin in PRC transmitting message to Mao Zedong
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3231
BEIJING. Soviet Ambassador.
Only by telegraph
Sent 18:40 8.7.50
Delivered 8.7.50
Communicate to MAO ZEDONG that the Koreans are complaining that there is no representative of CHINA in KOREA. A representative should be sent soon, so that it will be possible to have communications and resolve questions more quickly, if, of course, MAO ZEDONG considers it necessary to have communications with KOREA.
FILIPPOV [Stalin].
No. 379/sh.
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, List 82 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 117]

22. 13 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong (via Roshchin)
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3305
BEIJING Only by ciphered telegraph
SOVIET AMBASSADOR Sent 03:15 13.7.50
Transmit to ZHOU ENLAI or MAO ZEDONG the following:
"1. The English have officially appealed to us through their ambassador in Moscow and declared that they, being bound by the decision of the Security Council, cannot now make proposals regarding a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, but if the Korean People's Democratic Republic withdraws its troops to the 38th parallel, then this could hasten a peaceful resolution of the Korean question.
The English ask the Soviet government to express its opinion.
We consider such a demand by the English to be impertinent and unacceptable.
We intend to reply that the Korean question has become too complicated after the armed foreign intervention and that such a complex question can be resolved only by the Security Council with the participation of the USSR and China and with the summoning of representatives of Korea in order to hear their opinion.
Communicate your views.
As regards the statement of the Indian ambassador, we have decided not to answer him, since they made it clear that his statement is his personal opinion, in which the Indian government is not involved.
2. It is not known to us whether you have decided to deploy nine Chinese divisions on the border with Korea. If you have made such a decision, then we are ready to send you a division of jet fighter planes--124 pieces for covering these troops.
We intend to train Chinese pilots in two to three months with the help of our pilots and then to transfer all equipment to your pilots. We intend to do the same thing with the aviation divisions in Shanghai.
Communicate your opinion."
Telegraph fulfillment.
FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, List 85 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 118]. A copy of the telegram was sent to Shtykov in Pyongyang the same day (APRF, Fond 45, Delo 346, Listy 149-150) The same note was sent to Kim Il Sung on July 13, but without the section about the Indian ambassador. [AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, ll. 153-154]

23. 13 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Shtykov
8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 37219/sh
Pyongyang, Soviet Ambassador.
Advise the Koreans immediately to reply to [UN Secretary General] Trygve Lie that the Korean army is strictly adhering to the Geneva convention with regard to prisoners, and [that they should] let the Koreans make a statement in the press exposing the slander of the American press regarding poor treatment of prisoners by the Koreans. It would be good for someone among the prisoners to make a statement on the radio that the treatment of prisoners by the Koreans is very good.
FYN-SI [Stalin]
No. 4.4781
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov.
13.7.50
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, List 148]

24. 14 July 1950, handwritten letter, Kim Il Sung to Soviet Government (via Shtykov)
To the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK, Comrade Shtykov, T.F.
I ask you to transmit to the Government of the USSR the following:
In connection with the appeal of the English to the Government of the USSR with a demand about the withdrawal of troops of the Korean People's Army to the 38th parallel, the Government of the DPRK considers, as does the Soviet Government, that such a demand of the English is impertinent and unacceptable.
We are in full agreement with the opinion of the Soviet Government that the Korean question [should be] discussed in the Security Council with the participation of the USSR and China and with the summoning of representatives of Korea.
The Government of the DPRK [will take measures] quickly to clear the entire territory of Korea of American interventionists.
Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK
Kim Il Sung.
14.7.50.
[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 826, Listy 108-109]

25. 25 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Vyshinsky to Roshchin transmitting message from Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai
MID USSR
Tenth Department Received 4 hours 30 minutes 25/VII.1950
Dispatched 5 hours 55 minutes 25/VII.1950
CIPHERED TELEGRAM
To Beijing To Soviet Ambassador Roshchin
SPECIAL
TOP PRIORITY
To Your No. 1503.
On the authorization of Filippov, transmit to Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai that we agree with the proposed procedure and time period for training Chinese pilots on jet planes.
Telegraph the fulfillment.
VYSHINSKY
25.VII.50
Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Vyshinsky, 10th Department, Copy.
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, List 90]

26. 27 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3962
Beijing
To Comrade Kotov
To No. 1726.
Visit Zhou Enlai and transmit to him the reply to his telegram about military advisers.
"To Comrade Zhou Enlai.
The Soviet Government has satisfied your request about sending Soviet military advisers--specialists in PVO [Anti-Aircraft Defense] and VVS [Air Force] to the Eastern and Northeastern military districts. 38 advisers will be sent to China, of which 10 will be specialists in PVO and 28 specialists in VVS.
As regards the remaining 26 advisers, we consider that there is no special need to send them, since the work of these advisers can be fulfilled by the 38 advisers being sent to China, specifically: Adviser to the Chief of Staff PVO, apart from his main work can advise the work of the Chiefs of the operational and intelligence departments of the PVO district; Adviser to the Chief of Staff of the VVS can advise the work also of the Chief of the Operational Department of the Staff of the VVS district.
The 38 advisers will leave for China soon.
FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, List 94]

27. 28 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov)
8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 75021
Pyongyang Soviet Ambassador.
Verbally transmit the following to Kim Il Sung. If he demands it in written form--give it to him in written form, but without my signature.
1. The CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] salutes Comrade Kim Il Sung and his friends for the great liberational struggle of the Korean people which comrade Kim Il Sung is leading with brilliant success. CC VKP(b) has no doubt that in the soonest time the interventionists will be driven out of Korea with ignominy.
2. Comrade Kim Il Sung should not be embarrassed by the fact that he does not have solid successes in the war against the interventionists, that the successes are sometimes interrupted by delays in the advance or even by some local set-backs. In such a war continuous successes do not occur. The Russians also did not have continuous successes during the civil war and even more during the war with Germany. The greatest success of the Korean people is that Korea has now become the most popular country in the world and has turned into the banner of the movement in Asia for liberation from the imperialist yoke. The armies of all enslaved peoples will now learn from the Korean People's Army the art of bringing decisive blows to the Americans and to any imperialists. Moreover, Comrade Kim Il Sung should not forget that Korea is not alone now, that it has allies, who are rendering and will render it aid. The position of the Russians during the Anglo-French-American intervention in 1919 was several times worse than the position of the Korean comrades at the present time.
3. Advise Comrade Kim Il Sung not to scatter the air force, but to concentrate it on the front. It is necessary that each attack by the People's Army on any portion of the front begin with a number of decisive blows by attack planes on the troops of the enemy, that the fighter planes defend the troops of the Peoples Army from the blows of the enemy planes as much as possible. If it is necessary, we can throw in additional assault aircraft and fighter aircraft for the Korean air force.
FYN-SI [Stalin]
28 August 1950
No. 483/sh
Copy No. 1 To Stalin
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 5-6, 10-11 (original copy); and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 155-156]

28. 31 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re meeting with Kim Il Sung
CIPHERED TELEGRAM
From Pyongyang. Sent 31.8.50 11:32 Received 31.8 17:27
Sent to the 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 31.8 17:35
By telegraph
FYN-SI [Stalin]
To No. 483/sh.
In accordance with your order of 29.8.50 I visited KIM IL SUNG and communicated to him the contents of the telegram. KIM IL SUNG listened to my communication and asked permission to write down its contents, which I dictated to him.
KIM IL SUNG received your letter very well, thanking you several times, underscoring that it is a very good letter.
Afterwards he asked my agreement to summon [Foreign Minister] Pak Hon-Yong and read him your telegram.
After exchanging opinions with Pak Hon-Yong he asked my opinion about whether he can bring it to the notice of the members of the PolitSoviet [Political Council] of the CC, in connection with which he underscored that this is a very important letter and he needs to communicate its contents since some members of the PolitSoviet are in a poor state of mind. It will be useful to them to know the contents of this letter.
I replied that if he considers this necessary then he can do it. KIM IL SUNG replied that he would convene the PolitSoviet tomorrow and read them the contents of this letter.
SHTYKOV
No. 1001
30.8.50
Copies: Stalin (2), Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, File of 8th Department.
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 12-13 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 159-160]

29. 31 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) transmitting letter from Kim Il Sung to Stalin
CIPHERED TELEGRAM
FYN-SI [Stalin].
I transmit the letter I received.
According to the report of KIM IL SUNG's secretary, MUN IL, this text of the letter was confirmed by the PolitSoviet of the CC of the Labor Party.
SHTYKOV
No. 1011/sh
31.8.1950
Copies to Stalin (2), Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, File of the 8th Department.
"DEAR comrade STALIN, I.V.
We are deeply touched by your attention.
We bring to you, our dear teacher, gratitude for the warm sympathy and advice. In the decisive period of the struggle of the Korean people we have received great moral support from you. We have firmly resolved to win the final victory in the struggle against the American interventionists, who are trying anew to enslave Korea.
In the noble struggle for independence and freedom we constantly feel your fatherly care and assistance.
We wish you many years of life and health.
Yours faithfully,
KIM IL SUNG
(upon commission of the PolitSoviet of the CC [Central Committee] of the Labor Party of Korea)
city of PYONGYANG
31.8.1950."
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 14-15 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 162]

30. 13 September 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 600155/III.
From Pyongyang Sent 13.9.50 Received 13.9. 13:15
Sent to the 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 13.9 13:22.
By telegraph.
Extremely urgent.
Moscow--Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.
In connection with the forthcoming session of the [UN] General Assembly, we consider it advisable to recommend to the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic to send a statement to the General Assembly and the Security Council, in which, on the basis of documents found in the archives of the Rhee Syngmann [South Korean] government, to show how the clique of RHEE SYNGMANN prepared an attack on the north, to set forth once again the position of the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic on the question of the illegality of the American intervention in Korea, to illuminate the barbaric acts of the American armed forces in Korea and to demand the adoption of measures for the immediate cessation of the American intervention and the withdrawal from Korea of the troops of the foreign interventionists.
In addition to this statement [we advise] to send to the General Assembly and the Security Council photocopies of the documents to which reference will be made in the statement of the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.
In such case as you agree to this proposal, we ask you to communicate when it would be convenient to send such a statement.
We would consider it advisable also to inform the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic about the position which the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly will take on the Korean question.
We ask your orders.
SHTYKOV
No. 1154/sh.
13 September of this year
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, File of 8th Department.
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 18-19 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 163-164]
[documents from 21 September 1950 through 14 October 1950 appear following the article in this issue by Alexandre Mansourov]
31. 25 October 1950, VKP(b) CC [All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] Central Committee Politburo decision with approved directives to Foreign Minister Vyshinsky (at the United Nations in New York) and to Soviet Ambassador in Washington
All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik), CENTRAL COMMITTEE
No. P78/332 To Comrades Bulganin, Molotov, Gromyko.
Excerpt from protocol No. 78 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKPR(b).
Decision of 25 October 1950
332. - About the use by the United States of Japanese in the war against Korea.
To confirm the draft order of MID USSR to Comrade Vyshinsky (attachment 1) and to the Soviet representative in the Far Eastern Commission (attachment 2).
SECRETARY CC
To p.332(op) pr.PB No. 78
Attachment 1
NEW YORK
TO VYSHINSKY
353. Your proposal about the inadvisability of supporting in the General Assembly the accusation made by the government of the DPRK against the USA, which is using Japanese in the aggressive war against the Korean people, we consider incorrect. A statement by the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly with a declaration of support for the accusation made by the government of the DPRK against the USA, cannot weaken our position with regard to this question in the Far Eastern Commission. Therefore it is necessary for you to support the protest of the government of the DPRK against the use by the Americans of Japanese servicemen in the war in Korea. Use the facts brought forth in the statement of Pak Hon-Yong, in one of your next speeches in the General Assembly at an appropriate moment, according to your discretion.
We are simultaneously giving an order to the Soviet representative in the DVK [Far Eastern Commission] to make a corresponding statement on this question and to support the protest of the government of the DPRK against the use by the United States of Japanese in military operations in Korea.
By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin].
A. GROMYKO
To p.332(op) pr.PB No. 78
TOP SECRET
Attachment 2
WASHINGTON
SOVIET AMBASSADOR
It is necessary for you the make the following statement at the next meeting of the Far Eastern Commission:
"As is known, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Pak Hon-Yong, has sent to the chairman of the General Assembly and to the chairman of the Security Council a protest against the use of Japanese servicemen in military actions in Korea. In this protest it is shown that in the fundamental facts found in the decree of the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, it is established that Japanese servicemen participated in battles in the area of Seoul together with American troops, that one Japanese company participated in battles in the area of Chkholvon and that a significant number of Japanese are found in the 7th and 8th divisions of the Rhee Syngmann troops.
The use by the United States of Japanese servicemen in military operations in Korea is a gross violation of the Potsdam declaration, and also of section III of the resolution of the Far Eastern Commission "Basic Policy in Relation to Japan after Capitulation" of June 19, 1947, and the resolution adopted on the basis of this document "Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Use of Japanese Military Equipment" of February 12, 1948. The Potsdam declaration and aforementioned resolution of the Far Eastern Commission provide for the full disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, forbid the reestablishment or possession of any kind of Japanese military formations.
The Soviet delegation supports the protest of the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic against the use by the USA of Japanese servicemen in the war against the Korean people. The Soviet delegation considers that the Far Eastern Commission must not disregard the aforementioned facts, which testify to the direct violation of the agreed-upon decision on the demilitarization of Japan."
Give the statement to the press.
A. GROMYKO
[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 827, Listy 141-143 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 155-157]
32. 28 October 1950, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin), via Roshchin
SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26239
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin
From Beijing Received 19 hours 50 minutes 28.10.1950
TOP PRIORITY T
TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]
27 October I received the following telegram from Mao Zedong addressed to you:
"Comrade Filippov!
In connection with the military situation that has developed in China at the present time, we urgently need to acquire from the Soviet Union the following armaments for the navy: high-speed torpedo boats, floating mines, armored ships, small patrol boats, minesweeping equipment, coastal fortress artillery and torpedo bomber planes.
I therefore intend to send immediately to Moscow by plane the commander of the navy Xiao Jinguang together with adviser Comrade Kuz'min in order to conduct negotiations with the responsible comrades of the Soviet Navy on the question of the request for the above mentioned arms and on the question of the construction of the Chinese navy in the future.
Along with Comrade Xiao Jinguang, two other comrades from the navy administration of China, Lue Shuchu and deputy chief of the rear administration of the navy Comrade Tsin I-tin, must also go [to Moscow].
I ask you to review the aforementioned and give me a corresponding reply.
MAO ZEDONG 27 October 1950."
Note:
Comrade Zakharov has familiarized himself with this telegram and considers that the trip of the naval commander with adviser Kuz'min is necessary.
ROSHCHIN
No. 2623
28.10
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, Listy 62-63]
33. 29 October 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong
CIPHERED TELEGRAM
BEIJING - to Comrade Zakharov
For MAO ZEDONG
To Comrade MAO ZEDONG
I received your telegram about naval matters. I agree to the trip to MOSCOW of XIAO, JINGUANG and the other comrades.
FILIPPOV [Stalin]
29.10.50.
Copies: Stalin, Bulganin
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, List 64]
34. 1 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Shtykov
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 5222
TO SHTYKOV
You request that our officers and advisers remain in the disposition of the [North] Koreans for the formation of Korean divisions. Such a point of view of yours is well known to us. But we do not know the points of view of the [North] Korean government, we do not know whether it wishes to have Soviet officers and advisers in the future or prefers to invite Chinese. You still have not communicated the point of view of the Korean government on this subject. We cannot impose our advisers and officers on the Korean government. Let KIM IL SUNG communicate his point of view regarding this.
FYN SI [STALIN]
1 November 1950
Copies: Stalin (2), 8th Department of the General Staff to Shtykov
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, List 84, and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 161]
35. 2 November 1950, ciphered telegram, S.E. Zakharov, Soviet military representative in Beijing, to Fyn Si (Stalin)
Second Main Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26416
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, Lomov
From Beijing 15 hours 30 minutes 2.11.1950
TOP PRIORITY E
FYN SI [Stalin]
To No. 5228 of 2.11.50
I report: Through Colonel Petrachev, adviser to the Korean air force, I have obtained the following specific information:
1. By the first of November a regiment was formed using 26 Korean pilots that have been trained and 24 Yak-9 planes that are located in An'dun.
2. On November 1 of this year, 8 planes of this regiment went into battle for the first time, in the region of ANSIU. As a result of this flight 2 B-29 planes and a Mustang were downed. Two Yak-9's did not return from the battle.
The first report from comrade Belov to me about the loss of the two Yak-9 planes in a battle in the region of ANDONG-SINGISIU was thus imprecise.
The losses relate to a battle in the region of ANSIU.
3. In a battle on November 1 of this year, in the region of ANDONG-SINGISIU, two F-82 planes were downed by our pilots in MIG-15's and two planes were downed by anti-aircraft artillery. In all 4 planes [were downed].
We had no losses in the air battle.
4. MIG-15's of Comrade Belov flew from airbases at MUKDEN and AN'SHAN'. In all, 8 sorties were made from each airport.
5. At present there are 16 battle [as opposed to training] Yak-9's at the airbase at ANDONG. In an attack on the Andong airport on 1 November 1950 one Yak-9 was burned and 3 were put out of action, but it is possible to restore them. In addition, 2 planes were lost while patrolling.
In all 22 planes and 2 planes did not return from the region of ANSIU.
In addition to the Yak-9's there are:
a) 6 PO-2 planes, which are fully combat ready and are carrying out night missions. There are 14 pilots, and from the 15 PO-2 available, 5 planes crashed during landings and takeoffs at the airfield itself and 4 planes were lost while on missions.
b) 25 pilots for IL-10 planes, but up to now there are no planes for them
6. The command of the mixed air division of Koreans in ANDONG has been formed. It is headed by General LI FART.
7. Comrade PETRACHEV asks about the possibility of receiving 25 Il-10 planes and 10 PO-2 planes.
[S.E.] ZAKHAROV
No. 2702
2.11.50
Report: No. 5228 of 2.11.50 asked Comrade Zakharov about the fact that there are discrepancies between his report and Belov's report about the air battle in the region of Andong. He was ordered to elucidate this discrepancy and report about the participation of Korean planes in battles and about the fact that two of them did not return.
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 71-72 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 187-188]
36. 8 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov )Stalin)
SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26637
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko
From Beijing Received 02 hours 00 minutes 8.11.1950
TOP PRIORITY T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
In view of the fact that the infantry arms of the People's Liberation Army are mainly trophies captured from the enemy, there is a great variety in the calibers of the rifles.
Such a situation creates great difficulty for the manufacture of ammunition, and in particular for the production of rifle and machine gun cartridges, especially as our factories can produce only very small quantities of these cartridges.
At present the troops of the volunteer army, in the amount of 36 (thirty-six) divisions of the twelve armies, which are taking part in military operations in KOREA, have only (six) battle sets of rifle-machine gun cartridges. In the future, in connection with the development of military operations, we will have a very great need to supply the army with ammunition. If there is no change in military production, then the rearmament can be begun in the second half of 1951.
For overcoming the difficulties of the present time I ask you to review the question of the possibility of the delivery of small arms for 36 (thirty-six) divisions in the course of January and February 1951, according to the following list (name, quantity in pieces):
1. Soviet rifles 140,000.
2. Rifle cartridges 58,000,000.
3. Soviet sub-machine guns 26,000.
4. Cartridges for sub-machine guns 80,000,000.
5. Soviet light machine guns 7,000.
6. Cartridges for light machine guns 37,000,000.
7. Soviet heavy machine guns 2,000.
8. Cartridges for heavy machine guns 20,000,000.
9. Pilots' handguns 1,000.
10. Cartridges for pilots' handguns 100,000.
11. TNT 1,000 tons.
I ask you to communicate to me the results of your review of my request.
I wish you health.
MAO ZEDONG
No. 2784
7.11.50
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 80-81]
37. 9 November 1950, VKB(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message from Gromyko to Roshchin with message for Zhou Enlai
ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE
No. P78/448 To Bulganin, Molotov, Gromyko.
9 November 1950
Excerpt from protocol No. 78 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)]
Decision of 9 November 1950
448.- Question of MID USSR.
To confirm the attached draft of a telegram to Comrade Roshchin on the question of the participation of China in the Security Council.
SECRETARY CC
To p.448(op) pr.PB No.78
BEIJING
SOVIET AMBASSADOR
For transmission to Zhou Enlai.
I have received your telegram with the request for a consultation on the question of the participation of China in the [UN] Security Council.
In our opinion two variants are possible.
The first variant [is] to refuse to accept the invitation in the manner in which it was formulated in the Security Council. Motives: the invitation deprives the Chinese people's republic of the right to discuss in the Security Council the most urgent questions of China, in particular the question of the military intervention in Korea and the question of the seizure of Taiwan by the United States of America, its right being limited only to the review of the report of MacArthur.
The second variant [is] to accept the invitation and to commission the Chinese delegation to make a statement in the Security Council on all the abovementioned questions, turning the discussion of the question into an indictment of the USA. If they do not allow the Chinese delegation fully to lay out its position, the Chinese delegation will walk out of the meeting and refuse to discuss even one report of MacArthur.
It seems to us that the first variant is more advisable.
You should not connect yourself to the conduct of the Soviet delegate in the Security Council, where he voted for the resolution of the English delegate [Gladwyn] Jebb, especially since, speaking between us, Soviet delegate [Jacob] Malik did not have an instruction to vote for the English resolution, but had a direct directive to put in a veto if the Soviet resolution was rejected. Malik apparently was carried away by the fact that he had nevertheless forced the Americans to vote in favor of inviting China, but he did not take into account that the form of the invitation adopted by the Security Council would place China in a disadvantageous position.
Telegraph the fulfillment.
A. GROMYKO
[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 371, Listy 4-5]
38. 15 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) via Zakharov
SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26901.
Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev.
From Beijing Received 06 hours 10 minutes 16.11.1950
TOP PRIORITY T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade FILIPPOV:
I fully agree with your proposal to reinforce Belov's aviation force by an additional delivery of MIG-15 planes to China in two lots, numbering 120 (one hundred twenty) pieces and to create a command apparatus for the air corps.
As concerns questions regarding the airports in MANCHURIA and the strengthening of all PVO [Anti-Aircraft Defense] measures, we will resolve them together with comrade [S.E.] ZAKHAROV.
I express gratitude to the Soviet pilots for the heroism and effort they have displayed in battle, and for the fact that over the last 12 days they downed 23 invading American planes. I think that this is worth reporting to you.
I congratulate you on the successes!
MAO ZEDONG.
Nov 15, 1950.
NEW PARAGRAPH.
To Comrade FILIPPOV.
I report.
Your telegram was communicated at 20 hours 30 minutes local time 15.11.
ZAKHAROV
No. 2910
16.11
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 116 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 189]
39. 16 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Zhou Enlai to Filippov (Stalin)
SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26935
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev
From Beijing Received 20 hours 15 minutes 16.11.1950
EXTREMELY URGENT T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
At present the number of our troops operating in Korea has increased from 18 (eighteen) divisions of 6 (six) armies to 30 (thirty) divisions of 9 (nine) armies. Moreover we have another 9 divisions of 3 armies in reserve. In connection with this, transport is faced with very large tasks. With regard to automobiles, we have already received agreement from the Government of the Soviet Union about delivery of 3,000 automobiles before December 15.
It is necessary that we urgently resolve the question of gasoline and lubricant. I ask you to confirm the delivery of gasoline and lubricant in the quantity indicated below:
1. New request: 10 thousand tons of gasoline, 2720 barrels (capacity of 53 gallons, the same as below) of lubricating oil for diesel engines, transmission oil 220 barrels, brake oil 110 barrels, yellow oil (Grease) 144 barrels.
2. I ask you to ship the following oils on the oil quota agreed upon in the request made by the Ministry of Trade of the Chinese People's Republic to the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR: gasoline 7000 tons, diesel lubricant 2380 barrels, transmission oil 190 barrels, brake oil 95 barrels, yellow oil (Grease) 126 barrels.
3. The total quantity of various oils (1 and 2), which we must acquire from the Soviet Union: gasoline 17,000 tons, diesel lubricant 5100 barrels, transmission oil 410 barrels, brake oil 205 barrels, yellow oil (Grease) 270 barrels.
I ask you to deliver the first half (50%) of the aforementioned gasoline and oil by the end of December, and the second half (50%) by 20 January 1951.
Will this be subject to regulations?
We await your answer.
With bolshevik greetings.
ZHOU ENLAI
No. 2917
14/16.11.50
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 117-118]
40. 17 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Zhou Enlai to Filippov (Stalin)
SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26998
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev
From Beijing Received 20 hours 45 minutes 17.11.1950
EXTREMELY URGENT T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
According to a report from Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang, we have an insufficient number of automobiles engaged in transport to the rear, enemy planes are inflicting losses on autotransport, and also it is not possible to ensure the supply of local human and material resources, food supply and winter clothing cannot be secured in time and the troops are experiencing hunger and cold.
A new operation will begin soon. Railroad bridges across the Yalu are subjected to bombardment by enemy planes every day.
The river is beginning to freeze, and it is not possible to build submerged bridges and pontoons. Therefore until such time as the river is frozen, so that automobiles can cross the ice, we must in the next 8-9 days transport at an extraordinary speed food stuffs, winter gear and ammunition. If we do not, it will have an influence on the next stage of the fulfillment of the operation.
In view of this, besides the mobilization of all automobiles in Manchuria that could be mobilized on the front, we can mobilize a maximum of 200 automobiles from Northern China and immediately send them to the front to relieve the difficult situation.
I earnestly ask you to give a command to the commander of the Soviet Army on the Liaodong peninsula about the transfer of 500 automobiles for our army. These 500 automobiles will be reimbursed on the account of the portion which you promised to send from 25.11 to 25.12, numbering 3,000 automobiles.
Can you satisfy my request? I await your swift reply.
With bolshevik greetings.
ZHOU ENLAI
No. 2933
17.11 10:00
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 122-123]
41. 17 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai via Zakharov
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 5708
BEIJING
To Comrade Zakharov
For Comrade Zhou Enlai
I received the telegram with the request for urgent delivery of 500 automobiles. Your request will be satisfied by us. In order to speed up the transfer of the automobiles to you, having in mind to give you new automobiles, orders have been given to our military command not to give you old automobiles from Port Arthur, but to send new automobiles to the Manchuria [railway] station and to transfer 140 automobiles to Chinese representatives on 20 November and 355 automobiles on 25-26 November.
We will speed up the shipment of the remaining automobiles and another 1,000 automobiles will arrive at the Manchurian station before 5 December.
FILIPPOV [Stalin]
17 November 1950
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, List 124]
42. 17 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Gromyko transmitting 16 November 1950 message from Kim Il Sung to Stalin
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 600742/III
From CORRESPONDENT 13 Sent 17.11.50 Received 18.11 4:03-19:35
Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces USSR 18.11 4:20-19:50
By telegraph
extremely urgent
To Comrade GROMYKO
I transmit a note I received from the Korean government with the following contents:
"TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR
Comrade STALIN I.V.
For preparation of pilot cadres needed for the forthcoming offensive operations against the American troops I ask you, Comrade STALIN, to allow:
1) The preparation of 200-300 pilots on the territory of the Soviet Union from among Korean students sent to the USSR for education.
2) The preparation of pilots for two regiments of jet planes and one regiment of bombers from among the 119 pilots of the Korean People's Army who are being trained on the territory of the Soviet Union.
3) The dispatch to the Soviet Union of 120 men for the preparation of aviation technicians and 30 crew members for attack planes which we ourselves are not in a position to prepare.
4) By January 1 to send an additional 170 Korean pilots to the Soviet Union for flight training, who will have completed theoretical preparation by that time.
I hope that you, comrade STALIN, will assist us in the resolution of these questions.
With respect KIM IL SUNG 16.11.50"
No. 15 T. SHTYKOV
17.11.50
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Sokolovsky, Shtemenko, Gromyko, file of 8th Dept. of General Staff of Armed Forces
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 88-89 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 180-181]
43. 20 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov)
8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 75835
To Comrade SHTYKOV
for Comrade KIM IL SUNG
I have received your telegram about the preparation of pilot cadres after a delay which was the fault of the Soviet apparatus.
In the opinion of our military this question is more expediently resolved in the following manner:
1. To organize the preparation of 200-300 pilots from Korean students, in the flight school already existing in YANTSZY on the territory of MANCHURIA. An additional contingent of Soviet instructors will be given for this.
2. The preparation of pilots for two jet fighter regiments can be organized at one of our jet divisions of MIG-15's located in MANCHURIA. After the preparation of the pilots, the appropriate number of MIG-15 planes will be delivered.
With regard to the preparation of pilots for one bomber regiment, it is more convenient to prepare them in the Korean school we have in the Far East Maritime Region. The materiel, TU-2 planes for the bomber regiment, will also be given.
3. We agree to accept an additional 120 men in the Korean pilot school that we have in the Far East Maritime Region, to train them as technicians and crew for attack planes.
4. It is better that the Korean pilots receive flight training in the place where they will study, i.e. in MANCHURIA or in our Maritime Region.
If you agree with these proposals, corresponding orders will be given to our military command.
FYN SI [Stalin].
No. 4/7556
20 November 1950
Copies: Bulganin, Shtemenko, Stalin.
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 90-91 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 165-166]
44. 22 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Kim Il Sung to Fyn Si (Stalin) via Shtykov
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 600782/sh
From CORRESPONDENT No. 18 Sent 22.11.50 6:30 Received 22.11 9:55
Sent to 8th Department of General Staff of Armed Forces 22.11 10:02
By telegram
Extremely urgent
To Comrade FYN SI [Stalin].
I transmit the letter I received from KIM IL SUNG addressed to you with the following contents:
"To Comrade FYN SI
I received your telegram of 20.11.50 about the preparation of pilot cadres. We fully agree with your opinions.
Accept, Comrade FYN SI, our deepest gratitude for your tireless assistance to the Korean people in its struggle for its independence.
Yours truly - KIM IL SUNG 21.11.50"
SHTYKOV
No. 35
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, File of 8th Department
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, List 94 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 182]
45. 1 December 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong
CIPHERED TELEGRAM
BEIJING - SOVIET AMBASSADOR
To transmit to Comrade MAO ZEDONG
Comrade MAO ZEDONG!
I received your telegram No. 3153.
I thank you for the information about the state of affairs in China, in connection with the successful offensive of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in Korea.
Your successes gladden not only me and my comrades in the leadership, but also all Soviet people. Allow me to greet from the soul you and your friends in the leadership, the People's Liberation Army of China and the entire Chinese people in connection with these enormous successes in their struggle against the American troops.
I have no doubt that in the war against the up-to-date and well-armed American army the Chinese army will receive great experience in contemporary warfare and will turn itself into a fully up-to-date, well-armed, formidable army, just as the Soviet Army in the struggle with the first-class-armed German army received experience in contemporary warfare and turned into an up-to-date well-equipped army.
I wish you further successes.
FILIPPOV [Stalin]
1 December 1950
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, List 5]
46. 5 December 1950, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved orders to Vyshinsky in New York and Roshchin in Beijing (with message for Zhou Enlai)
ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE
No. P79/167 To Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko
December 1950
Excerpt from protocol No. 79 of the meeting of Politburo CC
VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)]
Decision of 5 December 1950
167.- Telegram of Comrade Vyshinsky No. 802.
To confirm the draft orders to Comrade Vyshinsky (attachment 1) and to Comrade Roshchin (attachment 2).
TOP SECRET
Attachment 1
to p.167(op) pr. PB No. 79
New York
To Vyshinsky
802. We are answering point by point.
Regarding point one. We agree with your proposal. However, you should not make the stipulations you proposed, that the Assembly has the right to review a question of aggression if the Security Council turns out not to be in a condition to fulfill its obligation regarding supporting peace. Such a stipulation would mean that we recognize as having legal force the resolution of November 3, which the Soviet delegation declared unlawful, as a contradiction of the UN Charter.
Regarding point two. We agree with your proposal. As for the invitation to a representative of the Chinese People's Republic to participate in the discussion of this question in the General Assembly, do not introduce a proposal about the invitation before you receive from us an additional order, which we will give after the government of the PRC makes it clear whether it considers it advisable for its representative to participate in the discussion of this question in the General Assembly.
Regarding point three. We agree with your proposal.
By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin].
A. GROMYKO
TOP SECRET
Attachment 2
to p.167(op) pr.PB No. 79
Peking
Soviet Ambassador
Urgently visit Zhou Enlai and communicate to him the following.
According to the report of Comrade Vyshinsky, the Americans will introduce into discussion at the [UN General] Assembly a question under the heading "The Intervention in Korea of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic."
The Soviet delegation will express opposition to the inclusion of this question on the agenda. If it nonetheless is included, the Soviet Government needs to know the opinion of the government of the Chinese People's Republic--whether it considers it advisable for its representative to participate in the discussion of the question raised by the Americans in the General Assembly. If Zhou Enlai asks what the point of view of the Soviet Government is on this question, you should answer that in this case, as well as in the case of the discussion of MacArthur's report in the Security Council, the Soviet Government considers it more advisable that the Chinese government not take part in the discussion of this question in the General Assembly.
Telegraph the results.
A. Gromyko
[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828, Listy 19-21 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 4-6]
47. 7 December 1950, ciphered telegram from Roshchin conveying message from Zhou Enlai to Soviet Government
CIPHERED TELEGRAM
Copying Prohibited
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Gromyko, Copy.
From Beijing No. 35379 6 hours 55 minutes 7/XII 1950
Special Nos. 2522, 2523
TOP PRIORITY
SPECIAL
On December 7 at 3:00 Beijing time Zhou Enlai invited me to his [office] and transmitted the following in the name of the Chinese government:
At Lake Success representatives from India, England, Sweden and the general secretary of the UN Trygve Lie have recently appealed several times to the representative of the Chinese people's republic [General] Wu Xiu-quan asking under what conditions it is possible to end the military operations in Korea.
Their aspirations are to hold the position in Korea at the 38th parallel.
Not wishing to put ourselves in a disadvantageous position and having the goal of holding the initiative in our hands and also showing assertiveness on this question, the government of the Chinese people's republic intends to give the following instruction to Wu Xiu-quan for answering the representatives of India, England, Sweden and Trygve Lie:
"Military operations in Korea will be ended under the following conditions:
1. The withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.
2. The withdrawal of American troops from the Taiwan strait and from the territory of Taiwan.
3. The Korean question must be resolved by the Korean people themselves.
4. The participation of a representative of the Chinese people's republic in the UN and the exclusion from the UN of a representative of Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek].
5. Convening a conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of the four great powers for the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan.
6. If the five aforementioned conditions for the cessation of military operations are accepted, the five great powers can send their representatives to convene a conference for signing the conditions of an armistice."
Zhou Enlai transmitted the enumerated conditions in written form.
Further, Zhou stated that before sending the present conditions for cessation of military operations in Korea, the Chinese government wishes that Wu Xiu-quan consult with the government of the USSR and asks the Soviet government to express its opinion on this question.
Zhou Enlai earnestly asked [me] to transmit to the Soviet government that the Chinese government wishes to receive an answer today.
I stated to Zhou Enlai that what was communicated by him: the report, the conditions for ceasefire in Korea and the request for an answer will be immediately brought before the government of the USSR.
7.XII.50 ROSHCHIN
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, Listy 17-19 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 193-195]
48. 7 December 1950, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message to Vyshinsky in New York
ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE
No. P79/189 Copies to Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko.
7 December 1950.
Excerpt from protocol No. 79 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bol'shevik)]
Decision of 7 December 1950.
189. Telegram of Comrade Vyshinsky No. 825.
To confirm the proposed draft order to Comrade Vyshinsky.
SECRETARY CC
to p.189(op) pr.PB No. 79
New York
To Vyshinsky
No. 825. Your proposal about the cessation of military activity in Korea we consider incorrect in the present situation, when American troops are suffering defeat and when the Americans more and more often are advancing a proposal about a cessation of military operations in Korea, in order to win time and prevent the complete defeat of the American troops.
The draft of the Soviet delegation should include the following:
1. The immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.
2. The resolution of the Korean question must be left to the Korean people themselves.
The text of your preamble does not elicit objections.
By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin].
A. Gromy